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STATE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT: THE NORTH
CAROLINA MODEL
The need for modernization and expansion of a broad range of
public services has made municipal borrowing. an increasingly impor-
tant, ever expanding process.' Yet because of a concern for the indi-
vidual taxpayer and a sense of fiscal responsibility refined through
past experiences with debt issuance,2 virtually all states today place
1. Borrowing by state and local governments through the sale of municipal bonds attained
a new peak of over $24 billion in 1971.47 MUN. FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N NEWSLETTER 5 (1972).
This figure exceeds by more than $6 billion the previous record total of $17.5 billion which was
reported for 1970 in The Weekly Bond Buyer (January, 1970 Municipal Bond Sales Section,
March 22, 1971) at 16.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
STATE AND LOCAl. PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS AND FINANCING, STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIc PROGRESS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as STUDY];
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TO LOCAl. DEBT MANAGEMENT (1965) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE TECHNI-
CAl. ASSISTANCE];
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (1961) [hereinafter cited as
ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE RESTRICTIONS];
R. BYRD, COUNTY FINANCE (N.C. Institute of Gov't Series 1967) [hereinafter cited as
BYRD];
A. HII.I.HOUSE, MUNICIPAl. BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE (1936) [hereinafter cited
as HI.LHOUSE];
H. SECRIST, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON PUB-
I.IC INDEBTEDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1914) [hereinafter cited as SECRIST];
P. STUDENSKY, PUB.LIC BORROWING (1930) [hereinafter cited as STUDENSKY];
Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 863 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Bowmar];
Fesler, North Carolina's Local Government Commission, 30 NAT'L MUN. REV. 327 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as Fesler];
McMahon, The North Carolina Local Government Commission, in 1960 COUNTY
YEARBOOK OF THE N.C. ASS'N OF COUNTY COMM'RS [hereinafter cited as McMahon];
Stason, State Administrative Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness, 30 MICH. L. REV. 833
(1932) [hereinafter cited as Stason];
Interview with Edwin T. Barnes, Deputy Secretary, North Carolina Local Government
Commission, in Raleigh, N.C., March 1, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Barnes Interview].
2. States are concerned with insuring the fiscal responsibility of local governments because
of the risk of citizens losing confidence in a financially insecure local government, the threat
to individuals of burdensome taxation due to overborrowing by municipalities, and the possibil-
ity of harm to the municipal creditor. See Kiernan, Kubale & Bugge, Wisconsin Municipal
Indebtedness: Conclusions and Recommendations, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 604, 605. Uncontrolled-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
either constitutional or statutory limits upon the power of municipali-
ties to incur debt 3 In the inevitable collision between municipalities'
kinetic demands for monies and these often-termed "inflexible" or
"anachronistic" state limitations, 4 methods for circumventing the
restrictions have been devised which in many cases have resulted in
high levels of poorly planned debt.5 Despite suggestions that all quan-
titative debt restrictions be abolished,' some state control over the
level of municipal debt issuance seems inevitable; the fundamental
question is how varying local needs for borrowed funds can be recon-
ciled more effectively with state interests in maintaining a reasonable
ceiling on debt.7
During the Depression, when constitutional and statutory limita-
tions failed to halt a surge of borrowing and subsequent defaults by
local units, the state of North Carolina enacted a statutory scheme
which provided for centralized control of all local debt issuance by a
state administrative body, the Local Government Commission.' For
forty years the Commission has assisted local units in debt planning
and management, helping them to avoid unnecessary debt and build-
ing a system through which local units have been able to issue debt
debt issuance by a local government may severely limit its ability to borrow in the future and
thus prospectively impair its budgetary flexibility; at the same time a single unit's excesses may
increase the cost of borrowing for many other units within a state by diminishing the confidence
of investors. ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE RESTRICTIONS 37-38.
3. The most widely used state controls upon municipal debt seek to limit the quantity of
debt which a local government may incur. The constitutional or statutory provision which limits
the level of debt to a stated percentage of assessed property values within a local unit is the
primary type employed. F. STARNER, GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND FINANCING BY LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: A SURVEY OF STATE CbNTROLS 8 (1961). See notes 23, 33 infra and accompa-
nying text. Other quantitative controls include ceilings on tax rates which limit the amount of
tax that can be levied for debt service requirements, and requirements that proposed bond issues
be approved by referendum. ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE RESTRICTIONS 30-33. In addition, some
states attempt to control the compositon and quality of municipal debt. See notes 35-38 infra
and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Bowmar 891-94; Magnusson, Lease-Financing By Municipal Corporations as
a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 377, 394-95 (1957); Comment,
Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15 VIL. L. REv. 612, 629 (1970),
5. See notes 27-33 infra and accompanying text.
6. See Magnusson, supra note 4, at 395; Note, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal
Indebtedness, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 462,487. See generally Aronson, A Comment on Optimality
in Local Debt Limitations, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 107 (1971); Hand & Mitchell, Optimality in Local
Debt Limitation: Comment, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 101 (1971).
7. For suggestions concerning the attainment of this balance see ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE
RESTRICTIONS 65-85.
8. The Local Government Act, ch. 60, §§ 1-78, [1931] N.C. Pub. Laws 60-84.
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at lower costs. This Note will describe the North Carolina statute's
unique position in the historical and definitional background of tradi-
tional debt restrictions, explain the statutory scheme and its imple-
mentation, and critically examine the continuing viability of the pro-
visions and their significance for state and local governments gener-
ally.
Historical Origins of Debt Restrictions
The imposition of restraints upon municipal borrowing can be
traced to the experiences of the states during three periods of national
economic expansion In the first half of the nineteenth century the
states themselves borrowed extensively in order to make public im-
provements to promote the nation's growth.10 However, following the
Panic of 1837 when most of the debts came due, many states found
revenues insufficient to cover their obligations."1 As part of a general
movement to curb legislative powers and as a specific reaction to
these borrowing excesses, voters in many states approved constitu-
tional limitations on the state's power to incur debt. 2 During the
period between the end of the Civil War and 1900, constitutional
prohibitions against state borrowing to fund public improvements
were interpreted as restricting only the state governments. 3 As a
result, municipalities were able to continue unlimited borrowing to
expand public services, and more significantly, to give credit back-
ing to private industries (particularly the railroads) in order to
encourage investment. 5 When many municipalities defaulted on their
9. An excellent summary of this historical development is K. BEASLEY, STATE SUPERVISION
OF MUNICIPAL DEBT IN KANSAS: A CASE STUDY 4-14 (1961). See also P. STUDENSKI & H.
KROoss, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 128-36, 192-200, 344-52 (1952). For
further historical treatment of the evolution of municipal debt restrictions see HILLHOUSE;
SECRIST 54-73; STUDENSKY.
10. For discussion of the historical origins of state borrowing and the imposition of re-
straints thereon, see generally B. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS (1941); W. SCOTT, THE
REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS (1893); SECRIST 13-31; STUDENSKY 7-9.
11. See B. RATCHFORD, supra note 10, at 86-87, 96-100.
12. Id. at 121-22. See SECRIST 32-44 for description of the types of restrictions which were
imposed.
13. SECRIST 63-65.
14. See HILLHOUSE 34.
15. American businessmen financed the westward expansion of the railroads through sales
of securities to an eager market, a large segment of which was foreign. As investors demanded
guarantees for these loans, many local governments backed the debts with their taxing power,
viewing the increased values which were expected to result from the development of commerce
Vol. 1972:487]
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bonds following economic declines in 1873 and in the 1890's," states
responded to the demands of overburdened taxpayers and empty-
handed bondholders by setting constitutional and statutory standards
which typically prohibited municipal investment of public money in
private concerns and established debt limits for local units, expressed
as percentages of property values.'" But as municipal defaults de-
clined after 1900, local units began to make steady increases in debt
which accelerated after World War I-restrictions on borrowing
were bypassed as debt limits were ignored, overlapping units created,
old services expanded, and new services added." At the outset of the
Depression, municipal credit was again overextended and defaults
began to occur." Nevertheless, a number of deficient units continued
to borrow, prompting a number of states not only to tighten constitu-
tional and statutory debt restrictions, but also to institute centralized
supervision of certain aspects of municipal debt incurrence."0
Each of these three periods encompassed a common cycle."'
Rapid ecoiomic growth spurred local borrowing intended to lend
momentum to developing business and industry. When the economy
slowed and the flow of money diminished, state units found their
credit overextended and their ability to repay outstanding obligations
overreached. In each instance the states reacted by imposing borrow-
ing restraints designed to prevent recurrence of the cycle, thus form-
ing the bases for the present constitutional, statutory, and administra-
tive measures for control and management of local debt.
Types of Debt Restrictions
State constitutional ceilings on municipal borrowing are the most
both as a justification for their debt incurrence and as a means for payment of the debt. In
most instances these schemes were approved by the courts. SECRIST 54-55. See C. CHATArrs,
MUNICIPAL. DEBT DEFAULTS: THEIR PREVENTION AND ADJUSTMENT 10-13 (1933); HILLHOUSE
143-99.
16. See HILLHOUSE 39-42.
17. See SECRIST 59-63, 70-71; STUDENSKY 12.
18. HILI-HOUSE 3-4.
19. For discussion of the scope of municipal defaults during the Depression see id. at 12-
30.
20. An analysis of these attempts at control of debt through administrative supervision is
found in Stason 842-58.
21. See HILLHOUSE 238-39; STUDENSKY 30-31; Note, supra note 6, at 463.
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widespread and the most restrictive type of debt limitation.2 2 De-
signed to prevent local financial irresponsibility with its concomitant
overtaxation and default on municipal obligations, these provisions
remove from both citizens and legislatures the ability to incur debt
beyond a stated maximum. The typical constitutional limit restricts
the total amount of debt that may be outstanding at any time,
whether approved by the local voters or not, to a fixed percentage of
the assessed value of the real property within a municipality.2? Since
such debt ceilings can be changed solely through the extended process
of amendment to the state constitution, they consequently preclude
exceptions which might be made in especially meritorious cases. In
addition, their scope is indiscriminate, applying alike to areas with
greater and lesser needs to incur debt.24 Moreover, such constitutional
restrictions attempt to control merely the quantity rather than the
quality of indebtedness, and within the prescribed limits borrowing
and spending are unrestricted.2 1
Constitutional debt limits have often failed to perform even the
limited role of placing a ceiling on debt. Faced with demands for
funds, local units have circumvented these rigid provisions through
methods which have not only nullified the quantitative restrictions
but have often effectuated the very evils the provisions were designed
to prevent. 2 For the performance of such isolated functions as sanita-
tion and education, municipalities have created special districts or
authorities which are considered independent governmental units, in
some instances capable of borrowing up to the constitutional maxi-
mum.2 7 Such districts retire debt through general property taxes,
special assessments, or increased user charges. As the taxpayer be-
comes obligated to one or more special districts in addition to his
home municipality, his actual financial burden may easily exceed that
22. See Kiernan, Kubale & Bugge, supra note 2, at 605 n.947 (noting proliferation of
constitutional restrictions); Comment, supra note 4, at 628 (citing inherent inflexibility of this
type of restriction).
23. Bowmar 866. Other states use a limit based on the same debt/property ratio with a
provision for a higher percentage limit where debt issuance is approved by local voters, or limit
debt to current annual revenues, with an allowance for additional voter-approved indebtedness
up to a designated percentage of assessed valuation. Id. at 866-67.
24. Stason 838-39.
25. Id. at 838.




envisioned by the constitutional limit.2 Moreover, in spite of consti-
tutional restrictions, units which have reached the debt maximum
may finance self-supporting improvements through revenue bonds.
These bonds are redeemed solely through funds derived from opera-
tion of facilities constructed with the proceeds from the bonds. 2 Since
revenue bonds are not guaranteed by the full taxing power of the local
government, they are usually omitted from computations of debt for
purposes of quantitative debt restrictions." Taxpayers still repay the
debt through user charges or special assessments, and since such
bonds are not supported by the taxing power of the community, they
entail higher interest costs than if the municipality had issued general
obligation bonds .3  Circumvention has also been achieved through
debt incurred in long term sales or lease agreements, where periodic
payments for capital improvements made from current annual reve-
nues are considered a current expense.3 2 However labeled, this
practice constitutes borrowing, and the taxpayer still provides the
funds for the rental or installment payments. 3
Perhaps because of the negative character of constitutional debt
restrictions, a number of states have chosen to rely heavily upon
statutory schemes for the control of local debt. Such provisions may
28. Id. at 870. For more detailed discussion of the phenomena of special districts and
authorities, see ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROBLEM OF
SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (A-22 1964); J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT
GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1961); Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public
Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958);
Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional Debt Linlta-
tions, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 201-08 (1937).
29. Operating revenues may include tolls, charges, rents, or assessments paid by persons
using or otherwise benefiting from the improvement. INVESTMENT BANKERS ASS'N OF AMER-
ICA, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 3 (4th ed. 1965). In contrast, general obligation
bonds are backed by the taxing power of the issuing municipality to insure their payment. Id.
See also A. RABINOWITZ, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 33 (1969).
30. See generally ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE RESTRICTIONS 53-57; J. MAXWELL, FINANC-
ING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 199-205 (1965).
31. ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 6-7; ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE
RESTRICTIONS 55-56; MAXWELL, supra note 30, at 204-05.
32. Local governments thus encourage a private party to construct a facility and then pay
the party rent for its use. In some states, rent to fall due after the current rental period does
not constitute present debt; therefore, the indebtedness of the municipality is increased not by
the full cost of the improvement, but only by the annual rent, even though the unit takes title
when rents have equalled the cost of the improvement. Magnusson, supra note 4, at 377. See
also Rogers, Municipal Debt Restrictions and Lease-Purchase Financing, 49 A.B.A.J. 49
(1963).
33. Magnusson, supra note 4, at 390-94.
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merely establish the same quantitative debt ceilings found in the
constitutions of other states and thus may represent only a slight
improvement over those restrictions." On the other hand, statutory
plans may attempt to determine municipal debt qualitatively as well
as to limit it quantitatively. Statutes which control the quality of local
debt tend to limit its quantity at the same time and afford a better
approach toward balancing the state's desire for debt limitation and
local needs for funds than do arbitrary debt ceilings alone. Moreover,
statutes which emphasize responsible debt management serve the
municipality through savings realized by efficient debt issuance; at
the same time, the state interest in limiting debt is effectuated when
community demands for increased borrowing slacken due to more
careful debt planning by local officials and due to the savings realized
through well-managed debt. Qualitative statutory guidelines are de-
signed to insure that the character of local debt will fall within certain
bounds deemed desirable by the legislature. For example, they may
limit net debt; set bounds for bond maturity schedules, sales prices,
and the manner of sale; and restrict the use of borrowed funds.3 5
As part of a state's statutory law, such plans are more susceptible
to modification and exception than are constitutional debt limits.
Yet, on the whole, they are still unresponsive to change.3 6 Further-
more, no one statutory scheme seems capable of providing effective
guidance to all of the varying municipal units within a state. Drafted
too narrowly, such statutes may restrict legitimate activity of well-
managed local units; drawn too broadly, they may permit misman-
agement.37 However well-written the statute, the potential for misun-
derstanding by local officials is always present.3 8 Genuine disputes
34. As statutes, they are easier to amend and subject to legislative exception, in contrast
to constitutional restrictions which require the extended process of amendment to the state
constitution for change or exception.
35. See Stason 840-42. Minnesota's Municipal Bond Code exemplifies the statutory scheme
for qualitative debt control. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 475.50 -.753 (1963), as amended, (Supp.
1971). For a general explanation of the functioning of the Minnesota statute, see Howard,
Current Municipal Bond Procedures in Minnesota, 40 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1956); Howard, An
Outline of Municipal Bond Procedure in Minnesota. 20 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1936). North
Carolina's Local Government Act is essentially the same type of plan, with the exception of
the important additional provision for interpretation and review by a state administrative
body-the Local Government Commission-of adherence to the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
.§ 159-1 to -68, as amended, (Supp. 1971).
36. Where statutes merely set quantitative debt limits, they can be subject to the same
circumvention as constitutional restrictions. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.




can be settled only by litigation; moreover, the burden is usually on
the local citizen to bring suit when he is threatened with injury."
After encountering the shortcomings of constitutional and statu-
tory debt controls, certain states have realized that maintenance of
local fiscal responsibility and conservation of the taxpayer's dollar40
not only requires measures designed to prevent misuse of local funds
but also calls for state assistance which will insure a high quality of
debt management by municipalities. Thus states have created admin-
istrative agencies which exert varying levels of control over local
debt.4' Because centralized control over local debt has been opposed
by many local governments and legislatures on the grounds that such
supervision restricts the right of municipal officials to operate within
the framework of the law, destroys local initiative, and establishes a
politically-oriented bureaucracy, 4 a number of states have limited
these agencies to providing debt management assistance on a strictly
voluntary basis. A well-planned example is the Vermont Municipal
Bond Bank, a state agency which for a minimal charge will buy bonds
from local units and resell them under its own name. 3 So long as it
sells bonds to the Bond Bank, a Vermont municipality is not bound
by the state's constitutional debt limit; moreover, it receives the bene-
fit of lower interest costs through the agency's handling of the sale.
Other states provide for a mandatory review of the legality of pro-
posed debt issuance in order to correct local abuses in the borrowing
process, to insure compliance with constitutional and statutory provi-
sions which authorize debt incurrence and require debt retirement,
and to assure taxpayers and investors of the authenticity and legality
of the bonds or notes to be issued. 4 For example, Louisiana requires
a local unit to submit any proposed bond issue to the State Bond and
Tax Board prior to the mandatory referendum approval by the unit's
39. Id.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See generally ADVISORY COMNM'N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 21-22; STUDY 252-
56. For a survey of early state administrative controls, see Stason 842-54.
42. See Craigie, "Centralize!"-A Call for Streamlined Bidding, The Daily Bond Buyer
(MFOA Special Conference Issue No. 1, May 28, 1962) at 39, 40; Stason 854-55.
43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4551-4710 (Supp. 1970); Heeseler, The Casefor Munlcl-
pal Bond Banks, The Bond Buyer (Daily & Weekly) (MFOA Special Conference Issue No. 2,
June 21, 1971) at 27, 45. Virginia provides optional financial services to municipalities which
include a successful system for marketing their bonds. See ADVISORY CONIM'N, STATE TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE 55-59; STUDY 255-56; Craigie, supra note 42, at 39. Michigan and Tennessee
also offer voluntary assistance. STUDY 252-53 & n.16, 255.
44. ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 52-54.
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voters. 5 Proposed bond issues are scrutinized to insure their conform-
ity to the law and, in the case of revenue bonds, their economic
feasibility." A state may also combine voluntary and mandatory
administrative controls over local debt issuance, as demonstrated by
the Division of Local Finance and the Local Finance Board of New
Jersey. Although local units customarily issue bonds according to
procedures set forth in the New Jersey Bond Law47 without any re-
quirement for approval by the Division of Local Finance, the Division
exerts important controls on debt issuance." On the other hand, upon
request, the Division will lend any local unit advice and assistance in
financial planning, including aid in the sale and issuance of bonds. 9
At the opposite end of the spectrum from purely voluntary agency
aid are state plans which provide for mandatory review not only of
the legal aspects of a proposed debt issue, but of its economic feasibil-
ity as well." North Carolina's Local Government Act51 falls within
this classification and is the most comprehensive of all of the state
provisions for centralized supervision of municipal debt issuance.
Origin of the North Carolina Statute2
Because of a seven-fold increase in debt following World War I,
45. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1801 to :1808 (1950).
46. Letter from H. L. Oncal, Jr., Secretary, The Louisiana State Bond and Tax Board, to
the Duke Law Journal, November 15, 1971.
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:2-1 to -64 (Supp. 1971).
48. All local budgets must be submitted to the Division for approval, and one of the main
points reviewed is the budget provision for debt service obligations in the upcoming year.
Should a New Jersey unit fail to repay its indebtedness on schedule, it becomes subject to
receivership and operation by the Municipal Finance Commission. The Local Finance Board
has authority to waive statutory debt limitations in appropriate cases, adding flexibility to the
state's quantitative debt restrictions. Letter from R. F. Keevey, Chief, The Office of Manage-
ment & Administration, New Jersey Division of Local Government Services to the Duke Law
Journal, December 14, 1971.
49. Id. See generally New Jersey Administrative Procedures, tit. 5 (Department of Com-
munity Affairs), subtit. D (Division of Local Finance); G. SKILLMAN, A HISTORY OF THE
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1917-1967 (1967) (published by the Division of Local Gov-
ernment). For accounts of the early work of the New Jersey agency see Hendrickson & Burger,
New Jersey Reaps Fruits of Good Municipal Finance Laws, 32 NAT'L MUN. REV. 419 (1943);
Hoffman, A State Department of Local Government, 28 NAT'L MUN. REV. 348 (1939).
50. Louisiana, Michigan, and North Carolina are the only states with agencies exercising
"coercive" scrutiny of all local bond issues. ADVISORY COMM'N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
22.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-I to -68 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
52. A thorough treatment of the background of the statute is contained in McMahon 93-
100. See also BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STATE CENTRALIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 80-106
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North Carolina's local governments by 1931 found their financial
status bleak. In the period preceding 1931, the state's municipalities
had financed roads, schools, and other capital improvements through
the issuance of bonds.5 3 Most issues had been readily sold to eager
buyers in the speculative market of the 1920's, and the lack of any
effective control over debt incurrence had provided a further incentive
to borrowing.54 Defaults had occurred with the bulk of the local debt
remaining to be paid during the next decade.5" Sinking funds, which
were intended to be built up incrementally to pay term bonds56 when
they came due, had in many cases been diverted and spent for other
purposes or had never been established.57 In some instances where
sinking funds had been initiated, the collapse of banks had tied up
the cash deposited.58 Many serial bonds had been improperly sched-
uled, resulting in unreasonable payment burdens for certain years. 9
The Depression aggravated all of these problems. Tax revenues fol-
lowed the decline of property values, while local demands for new and
increased public services grew. Yet local citizens opposed any in-
crease in taxes and even protested the enforcement of existing levies."0
Neither the County Government Advisory Commission, which had
been formed to advise and assist local governmental officials,' nor
the State Sinking Fund Commission, which had been given the task
of approving all bonds and notes proposed to be issued, 2 seemed able
(P. Betters ed., Institute for Gov't Research, Studies in Administration No. 26, 1932);
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION




56. Term bond refers to the type of debt issuance in which all or the major part of an issue
is scheduled to be repaid within a single year. On the other hand, a serial bond is part of an
issue of bonds which are due in a series of consecutive years. (For instance, where a unit sells
bonds to fund a facility, marking some for payment in 1984, some in 1986, some in 1988, etc.).
See RABINOWITZ, supra note 29, at 34. A unit which issues term bonds and fails to make annual
provisions for repayment by depositing revenues in a sinking fund will find itself impossibly
over-burdened financially in the year in which the bonds fall due.
57. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STATE CENTRALIZATION, supra note 52, at 98-99;
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT, supra note 52, at 87; Fesler 327.
58. Fesler 327.
59. Id. at 327-28.
60. Id. at 328.
61. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, STATE CENTRALIZATION, supra note 52, at 89-94;
McMahon, 96-98.
62. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT, supra note 52, at 85; McMahon 98.
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to cope with the fiscal problems of the state's municipalities. Thus,
in 1931 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Local Gov-
ernment Act," creating a far-reaching statutory scheme to guide
local debt management and delegating to the Local Government
Commission broad powers to effectuate the policies and dictates of
the Act. The provisions of this Act remain substantially unchanged
today.'"
The Local Government Act and the Role of the Local Government
Commission65
Composed of, four ex officio members and five other members
appointed by the governor, " the North Carolina Local Government
Commission functions as a separate and distinct division of the De-
partment of the State Treasury." The ex officio members constitute
the Commission's executive committee which is empowered to act for
the entire Commission, " subject to review by the Commission upon
the application of any aggrieved party who files for review within five
days after the challenged action. 9 The State Treasurer, acting in his
capacity as Director of Local Government, selects the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of the Commission who are retained as permanent
employees. 0 In practice, the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and
their staff make the basic decisions of the Commission, and the full-
time employees perform substantially all of its work. The Secretary's
63. Ch. 60, §§ 1-78, 11931] N.C. Pub. Laws 60-84.
64. In 1971 a revision of the Act which will become effective July 1, 1973, was approved
by the North Carolina General Assembly. The Local Government Finance Act, ch. 780,
§§ -_ [1971] N.C. Session Laws -_ compiled in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-1 to
-182 (Supp. 1971) (eff. July 1, 1973). This new version clarifies the language of the statute and
consolidates a number of provisions relevant to local government finance which were previously
scattered throughout the North Carolina statutes; however, the Act's basic provisions remain
unchanged. Several minor changes effected by the new statute will be noted below.
65. See generally R. RANKIN, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF NORTH CARO-
UNA 383-89 (1955); McMahon 115-45.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-3 (Supp. 1971). The State Auditor, State Treasurer, Secretary
of State, and Commissioner of Revenue are members ex officio. One of the other five appointed
members must have had experience as the chief executive officer or member of the governing
board of a city or town, and one must have had experience as a member of the governing body
of a county at the time of appointment. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. §§ 159-4 to -5 (1964).
69. Id. at § 159-6. Executive Committee approval of notes maturing not more than six
months from their execution is excepted from the review provision.
70. Id. § 159-3 (Supp. 1971).
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decisions are almost always accepted by the executive committee, and
the procedure for appeal to the full commission from the executive
committee is never utilized.'
Whenever a local unit in North Carolina incurs debt through the
sale of bonds or notes, the Local Government Commission is respon-
sible for supervising all aspects of the debt issuance process. In the
initial pre-election or pre-sale phase, the governing body of any local
unit in the state that proposes to issue bonds or notes must submit a
plan for the proposed issue to the Commission for approval.2 To
assist in determining whether the debt should be allowed to be
incurred, the Act provides the Commission with thirteen broad bases
for decision, ranging from the public need for the improvement which
is to be made from the bond sale proceeds to more concrete criteria
concerning the financial status of the unit. 3 In addition, the Com-
mission may scrutinize "[a]ny other matters which [it] may believe
to have a bearing on the question presented." This unique grant to
the Commission of power to screen every issuance of bonds or notes
in the state prior to submission of the question to voters of the local
unit or prior to sale where a referendum is not required" is fundamen-
71. The Executive Committee provides its important control function through raising,
discussing, and resolving broad policy issues which may confront the Commission, rather than
participating in its day to day technical decisions. Barnes Interview.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-7 (1964). Where the proposed issue is subject to voter approval,
see note 75 infra, the unit's governing board must provide notice of its intention to apply to
the Commission ten days before filing an application. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-7.1 (1964). The
statutory command clearly encompasses all the state's municipalities which have the power to
create debt: "the word unit will be used to refer to a county, city, town, incorporated village,
township, school district, school taxing district or other district or political subdivision of
government of the State . . . ." Id. § 159-2. See id. § 159-42 (Supp. 1971).
73. Id. § 159-8 (1964).
74. Id. If the Commission finds that the issuance of the proposed obligations is "necessary
or expedient" and financially feasible as defined by six enumerated criteria, it must approve
the issuance. Id. § 159-9.
75. The North Carolina Constitution provides that "[n]o county, city or town, or other
municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith, or lend its credit except for the
necessary expense thereof, unless approved by a majority of the qualified voters who shall vote
thereon in any election held for that purpose." N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). Thus, all debt issued
for "nonnecessary" expense functions must be approved by a unit's voters. BYRD 36. What
constitutes "necessary" expense is a question of law to be determined finally by the North
Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 22. Bridges, certain public buildings, and local needs such as
law enforcement, municipal water systems, electrical plants, and fire protection have been
termed necessary; important functions classed as "nonnecessary" expenses include airports,
hospitals, libraries, and recreation. Id. at 24-25, 30-32. See generally id. at 22-45; Coates &
Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses" Within the Meaning of Article VII, Section 7, of the North
Carolina Constitution, 18 N.C.L. REV. 93 (1940); Note, Airport Not A "Necessary Expense"
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tal to the Commission's role as a force for improving the quality of
local debt management.
The actual decision by the Commision to approve or disapprove
the proposed issue is usually made prior to formal application by the
local unit. Ordinarily, officials of a municipality interested in issuing
debt contact an officer of the Commission, submit data about their
local unit and the proposed issue, and then meet in informal confer-
ence with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to discuss the feasibility
of the issue.7" In assessing a proposed issue according to the standards
provided by the statute,77 the Commission usually bases its decision
primarily on the financial factors which affect the marketability of
the unit's bonds" and may offer suggestions to the local government
for amending its proposal to gain Commission approval. If the Com-
mission and the unit are unable to agree about the proposed issue,
the unit usually discontinues its plans for issuing debt. Should the unit
nevertheless provide notice and file a formal application for this pro-
cedure which is then tentatively disapproved by the executive commit-
tee, the officer or governing board of the unit filing the application
may request a public hearing79 and reconsideration by the committee,
after which the committee must enter an order stating the reasons for
Within Meaning of Article VII, Section 6, of North Carolina Constitution, 46 N.C.L. REV.
188 (1967).
Furthermore, voter approval is required for a unit to contract debt if the amount of debt
already contracted in a fiscal year exceeds two-thirds of the net debt reduction for the preceding
year or would exceed that sum if the proposed debt were issued. See N.C. CONST. art V, § 4(1).
For discussion of the "two-thirds limitation" see BYRD 250-65. Debt issued for four purposes
is specifically excepted from the two-thirds debt limitation: (1) funding or refunding a valid
existing debt, (2) borrowing in anticipation of the collection of taxes due and payable within
the fiscal year to an amount not exceeding 50 percent of such taxes, (3) supplying a casual
deficit, (4) suppressing riots or rebellion, or repelling invasions. N.C. CONST. art V, § 4(1). See
BYRD 259-60. The "necessary expense" and the "two-thirds" limitations operate concomitantly
to insure that virtually all long term debt to be serviced through taxes must be approved by a
unit's voters.
76. Barnes Interview.
77. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
78. Primary factors for consideration are the amount of outstanding debt owed by the unit,
the structure of that debt, and the unit's record for meeting debt service requirements. The
Commission usually allows the question of the necessity for the debt issuance to be decided by
the unit's governing board and its voters, and encounters the necessity issue only peripherally
in advising a unit on ordering its priorities for capital improvement. Barnes Interview.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-9 (1964). Before entering an order rejecting the application, the
committee must notify the unit of its intention to disapprove the issue, thereby affording the
unit the option of a hearing and reconsideration of the matter. Id. Presumably, if the unit did
not request a hearing, the committee would enter its order of disapproval.
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its decision.80 If the committee order is negative, the unit may file for
review by the full Commission within thirty days.8' Finally, an order
of either the executive committee or the full Commission may be
overturned by a majority of the voters of the local unit through a vote
held in the same manner as an election to approve the issuance of the
debt.8" However, these procedures for review are never relied upon in
practice. Testing an informal decision by Commission officials
through formal application to the executive committee or appealing
the committee's decision to the full Commission would be unavailing,
for, in reaching their decisions, both the executive committee and the
full Commission tend to rely upon the disinterested expertise of the
Commission's permanent staff. Moreover, resort to veto of a Com-
mission order by a unit's voters would be financially unwise-bonds
disapproved by the Commission would either not sell at all or would
sell at an extremely high rate of interest. In addition, such action
could jeopardize future attempts at issue by the unit.
After a unit's application for a proposed sale of bonds or notes
has been approved, after the unit's residents have voted in favor of
the issue (where such an election is required),83 and after certain
other preliminary preparations have been made, the Commission
concerns itself with its second major function-the supervision of the
actual sale of the bonds or notes."4 The Commission is responsible for
directing the unit's compliance with the detailed procedures of the
Local Government Act which govern the mechanics of an issue from
the initial notice of sale through the physical delivery of the instru-
ments to the buyer. In order to fulfill the requirement for notice,
which must be given at least ten days before the date fixed for the
receipt of bids,85 the Commission prepares a bulletin announcing the
sale and sends it to the unit in ample time for publication. In addition,
the Commission sends both notice of the sale and a prospective sale
circular to a number of potential buyers.8" The sale itself is also
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-10 (1964).
81. Id. § 159-11.
82. Id. § 159-10.
83. See note 75 supra.
84. Just as all proposed debt issuance by the state's units must first be approved by the
Commission, so all bonds and note of units are required to be sold by the Commission. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 159-13.(Supp. 1971).
85. Id.
86. The sale circular contains a broad description of the issuing unit, including pertinent
facts about its financial status. Notice of sale, and sale circulars are currently mailed to
approximately 280 prospective bidders. In addition, the sale is customarily advertised in The
Daily Bond Buyer. Barnes Interview.
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carried out by the Commission through its office in the state capitol.
The Commission receives sealed bids, 7 opens them in public, and
selects the bid which represents the lowest interest cost to the munici-
pality."8 The Commission then formally awards the sale to the pre-
vailing bidder and itself becomes a party to the contract for sale of
the bonds or notes.89 After printing and execution," the bonds are
delivered by the State Treasurer to the buyer91 in return for the sales
price, which the Treasurer then transfers to the unit's "custodian of
funds" or to its "properly designated depository. 19 2
The third major role of the Commission is its post-sale, post-
delivery supervision of the issuing local unit's financial affairs to
insure timely repayment of principal and interest as they become due
on the bonds or notes. During this phase of the debt issuance process,
the local unit must comply with several reporting requirements. The
Commission may at any time require a unit, through its accountant,
to submit a report on its financial condition. 3 Unit officers having
charge of funds are further required semi-annually, or as the Com-
mission may direct, to report the amount of funds on hand and the
security provided for them. 4 As a matter of practice, the Commission
requires semi-annual statements of financial condition by a munici-
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-13 (Supp. 1971). The Commission may privately negotiate the
refinancing of existing indebtedness. Id. It customarily arranges private sales of revenue bonds
under the provision of id. § 160-421.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-14 (1964). No bonds are to be sold at less than par and accrued
interest. If no legal bids are received, the bonds or notes may be sold at private sale. Id. § 159-
15. Officials of the unit may reject the Commission-approved bid before it has been awarded,
if they refuse all other bids. Id. § 159-16. However, due to the rapidly fluctuating market for
municipal bonds and in the interest of bidders, Commission policy requires that the officials
be present at the opening of the bids if they are to reject, and to make their rejection within
two hours after the prevailing bid has been chosen. Rejections are rare. Barnes Interview.
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-22 (1964).
90. The Commission executes the bonds when it is satisfied that the unit has complied with
all of the requirements of the Local Government Act. Id. § 159-18. Certification by the Com-
mission is necessary to validate the bonds or notes. Id.
91. Id. § 159-21. Formal delivery is made in person by a representative of the Commission.
Barnes Interview.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-21 (1964). The statute provides for deduction of "necessary"
Commission expenses from the funds received, "including the expense of advertising, selling,
shipping, and delivering the bonds or notes." Id. In practice the Commission bills the unit
directly for these expenditures which include charges for setting and printing bond circulars,
various postage expenses, and sale-related travel expenses for Commission personnel. There is
no charge for any of the Commission's supervisory services. Barnes Interview.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-30 (1964).
94. Id. § 159-29.
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pality which list the unit's debt and the purposes for which it was
incurred.15 As the unit makes payments on its bonds and notes, it is
obligated to notify the Commission of the bonds or notes paid." If a
unit has term bonds outstanding," the officer having charge of sink-
ing funds must invest them according to statutory direction 8 and
must make semi-annual reports to the Commission about the state
of the sinking funds.9
Simultaneously, the Commission maintains a complete record of
each issue of bonds or notes, keeping the information current by
means of the various periodic reports of the unit. Thus, thirty days
prior to the unit's annual levy of taxes, the Commission notifies the
unit of the amount of tax revenues which will be required for debt
retirement during the forthcoming year.' ° In addition, thirty days
before a payment is due to holders of bonds or notes, the Commission
informs the unit of the date for performance, the amounts due, and
the place for remittance.'"' Where term bonds have been issued and
the Commission determines that the unit's sinking funds have not
been invested in eligible securities, the Commission will so notify the
unit, and together with the unit will devise a plan whereby the funds
will be reinvested properly. 1 2 If sinking funds are not being main-
tained in sufficient amounts to retire the debt, the Commission orders
the local unit to comply with the statute.0 3
In addition to its direct supervisory role during the debt retire-
ment process, the Commission performs several peripheral functions
and holds certain additional powers which contribute to better finan-
95. Barnes Interview. Should a problem concerning the unit's finances arise, the Commis-
sion may require additional reports. Id.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-23 (1964).
97. See note 56 supra.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-25 (Supp. 1971). The investments or deposits made are subject
to the approval of the Commission's director. Id. The statute provides exclusive methods for
depositing funds at interest and delineates the classes of securities in which monies may be
invested. Id. § 159-28.1.
99. Id. § 159-27 (1964). The reports must include the amount of the unit's sinking funds
and the manner of their deposit or investment. Additional reports may be required at the
discretion of the Commission. Id.
100. Id. § 159-32.
101. Id. § 159-33.
102. Id. § 159-26.
103. Id. § 159-24: Refusal to comply with a Commission order by a municipal official
would seem to constitute a willful failure to perform a duty required by the Act, in violation
of id. §§ 159-38 to -39, warranting possible removal of the officer or a criminal prosecution
upon complaint of the Commission's director. See notes 110-16 infra and accompanying text.
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cial management among local units and thus increase the security of
the holders of bonds or notes. All contracts between local units and
an accountant or auditor for audit of their books must be approved
by the Commission, and the terms of the agreement must conform
to standards set by the Commission.0 The Commission has the au-
thority to require uniform systems of budget and accounting among
the local units of the state." 5 Moreover, the Commission is given
broad remedial powers should a municipality default on its obligation
to holders of bonds or notes. Where a unit has been in default for six
months, the Commission has the authority to investigate the unit's
finances, to advise the unit's governing board concerning refinancing
or readjustment of its debt, and to negotiate with creditors. 6 The
unit must accept a plan that has been deemed equitable and certified
by the Commission.' Once refinancing has begun, the Commission
is responsible for supervising the unit's adherence to the plan until the
agreement with the creditor has been discharged.' On the other
hand, the Commission, in the event of a municipality's default, may
elect to appoint an administrator of finance who will take over both
the collection of taxes in the unit and the control of its funds for a
period of up to one year (or longer with the governor's approval).,
As a final measure designed to establish the fiscal stability of local
units and to promote the security of their creditors, the Local Gov-
ernment Act contains provisions designed to guard against the mis-
management of local funds which have been earmarked for the pay-
ment of principal or interest or have been designated to a unit's
sinking fund. The Director of the Commission must report to the
governor any failure or refusal to comply with the Act by an official
of a unit or a member of the Commission, and the governor may
order the offender removed from office."0 After holding a hearing
and reviewing the governor's decision, the full Commission enters a
final order either confirming or refusing the removal."' If a financial
officer of a unit having funds on hand fails or refuses to pay principal
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-144 (1964).
105. Id. § 153-30.
106. See id. §§ 159-63 to -64.
107. See id.
108. See id. § 159-65 to -67.
109. Id. § 159-31.




and interest due to holders of bonds or notes in the required amount
at the designated time, he is both guilty of a misdemeanor and civilly
liable for damages to the aggrieved parties." 2 Similar penalties are
provided for a false statement knowingly made by any person in
response to a requirement of the Act;"' for the willful violation by
the Director or any member of the Commission, or by any officer or
member of a board of a unit, of any duty imposed upon him by the
Act;"' and for misappropriation of funds raised or set aside for pay-
ment of principal, interest, or sinking funds by any member of a
board of a local unit."5 Upon the complaint of the Director of the
Commission, the state attorney general is to investigate any charges
of a violation of the Act and may instruct the solicitor in the district
in which the offense was committed to institute a criminal action
against the alleged offenders."'
The Commission's Success
The Local Government Act proved to be effective as a compre-
hensive design to restore fiscal stability to North Carolina municipal-
ities during the Depression. During the early years of the Commis-
sion, new debt issuance was strictly limited to give local units the
opportunity to retire outstanding debt and correct default situa-
tions."' Where new issues were allowed, Commission scrutiny of sale
and retirement of these bonds brought increased efficiency and lower
interest costs. At the same time, the Commission initiated refinancing
plans among defaulting units."' In many cases, after a new schedule
had been set for the maturity of principal, units were able to begin
paying their obligations in full. On the other hand, in cases where
demanding full payment would create an excessive burden for the
municipality, interest rates were reduced on the outstanding sum. 9
The Commission also directed the sale and reinvestment of impro-
perly invested securities, wisely granting municipalities sufficient
112. Id. § 159-35.
113. Id. § 159-37.
114. Id. § 159-39.
115. Id. § 159-36.
116. Id. § 159-40.
117. See Ratchford, The Work of the North Carolina Local Government Commission, 25
NAT'l. MUN. REV. 323, 324-25 (1936).
118. See generally Fesler 332-33; McMahon 108-10.
119. See McMahon 110. In only two cases was a contraction of principal allowed. Id.
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time in light of the lowered values of the Depression to make the
adjustments without incurring unnecessary losses."'
The continuing success of the Commission in exercising a positive
influence over local debt under the Local Government Act markedly
contrasts with the experience of many states that rely solely on consti-
tutional or statutory provisions to control local debt. North Carolina
does have arbitrary constitutional and statutory restraints on munici-
pal borrowing. The state constitution requires a majority of a unit's
voters to ratify proposals to issue "nonnecessary" debt and calls for
popular approval of any obligation which will be repaid beyond the
current fiscal year if the amount of debt already contracted in that
year or the total debt to be incurred exceeds two-thirds of the unit's
net debt reduction for the preceding year. 2' In addition, North Caro-
lina statutes quantitatively limit municipal debt incurrence to ten
percent of the assessed valuation of taxable property for county
units 22 and to eight percent of assessed value for cities and towns. 23
Although similar quantitative restrictions have caused serious debt
issuance problems for local governments in other states, they have
had no apparent deleterious effect in North Carolina. A statutorily-
required mandatory property revaluation program, more realistic
property appraisal values, and higher assessment ratios have helped
to prevent the North Carolina net debt limitation from being oppres-
sive. 24 Additionally, since the Local Government Commission's ac-
120. See Ratchford, supra note 117, at 326.
121. See note 75 supra.
122. At present, county debt is selectively restricted. Debt for school purposes is limited to
5% of assessed valuation, except when a county has assumed all of its school districts' debt,
whereupon the limit is 8%. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-87 (1964). Debt for other than school
purposes is limited to 5% of assessed valuation, except for bonds issued for hospital purposes.
Id. § 131-126.23, 153-87. Effective July 1, 1973, all county debt will be subject to the same
restriction of 8% of appraised value by which cities and towns are to be limited. Id. § 159-55
(Supp. 1971) (eff. July 1, 1973).
123. Debt for cities and towns is currently limited to 8% of assessed valuation (bonds issued
for water, gas, electric, and power facilities; sanitary sewer facilities ordered constructed by
the Department of Water and Air Resources; and improvements to prevent erosion and en-
croachment of the ocean, are excepted from the restriction). Id. § 160-383. In 1973 the base
for the debt limit becomes 8% of appraised valuation. Id. § 159-55 (eft. July 1, 1973). Since
appraised values are significantly higher than assessed values, this change effectively raises the
net debt limit. Many units assess property for taxation at 50% of appraised valuation-in such
cases the statutory change will increase the limit by 100%.
124. BYRD 277. The change in 1973 from assessed to appraised property values as the basis
for North Carolina's net debt limitation will insure that the limit does not become unduly
restrictive. See note 123 supra.
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ceptable level of debt has almost invariably been lower than the
statutory maximum, 5 the Commission's examination of a unit's
level of existing debt and ability to support further debt prior to
approval of an issue of bonds or notes has itself been a significant
force for keeping municipalities' indebtedness well within the statu-
tory limit. Moreover, due to the Commission's screening of poorly-
planned or burdensome debt and refusing to allow issuance of such
debt, units themselves have been encouraged to keep debt within
reasonable bounds. In the rare cases where a unit reaches the statu-
tory debt limit and the Commission is still willing to approve further
debt through the issuance of bonds or notes, the unit may obtain the
legislature's approval for further borrowing."6
Because the quantitative debt limit has not proved unduly restric-
tive, and because Commission policy leaves units relatively free to
issue debt whenever borrowing is financially feasible,'21 there has been
no outcry against the North Carolina net debt limit and little evidence
of the costly circumvention devices commonly relied upon by munici-
palities in other states.2  Moreover, circumvention of the limit by
persons irresponsibly managing a unit's finances would be difficult.
Long-term lease or sale agreements 2 are considered to create debt
under North Carolina law.'30 Where special districts with the power
to issue bonds or notes exist,' their issues must be approved by the
Commission-the overlapping effect of this debt within another local
unit is considered, and borrowing that would prove burdensome is
refused. Financing through revenue bonds is not favored by the Com-
mission because of the higher interest cost of nonguaranteed debt.'32
Units are encouraged to finance revenue-producing facilities through
125. Barnes Interview.
126. See BYRD 278-79. Furthermore, although the Commission itself cannot make direct
exceptions to the limit, if it is convinced of the financial feasibility of a proposed increase in
net debt, it may suggest and arrange circumvention for the municipality. Barnes Interview.
127. See note 78 supra.
128. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
130. See BYRD 256. Beginning in 1973, North Carolina statutes will explicitly provide that
contracts and agreements entered into by municipalities which call for payment beyond the
current fiscal year are to be treated as if they were bond issues. The provision will thus expressly
require that such obligations be approved by the Local Government Commission and that the
sums committed thereby be counted against the legal debt limit. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-150
(Supp. 1971) (eff. July 1, 1973).
131. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
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general obligation bonds, making debt service payments from user
charges whenever possible, but backing the bonds with the com-
munity's taxing power.' Since the Commission will approve reve-
nue bonds only where general obligation financing is not practicable
and projections indicate with requisite certainty that a proposed facil-
ity will generate sufficient revenues to retire the debt, 134 nonguaran-
teed debt affords no ready method for by-passing debt restriction in
North Carolina.
While the Local Government Commission has been successful in
exerting a flexible control over local debt incurrence, perhaps the
most interesting feature of the North Carolina system has been the
dollar savings to the local units (and thus indirectly to the taxpayer)
which it has effected. Valuable assistance in the areas of budgeting
and accounting has been given municipalities by the Commission. 135
The advice, planning, and supervision during the debt issuance pro-
cess represents a saving which would have been a significant expense
had the unit been required to seek outside help. The greatest long-
run benefits to municipalities, however, have been the savings on the
interest costs of local borrowing realized through the Commission's
control over the entire process of issuing bonds and notes.
A recent study has indicated that general obligation bonds of
North Carolina municipalities sell at consistently lower rates of inter-
est when compared with the other southern states as a whole.'36 One
of the chief reasons for the success of North Carolina bond issues has
been the relatively high bond rating given the state's municipali-
133. Barnes Interview.
134. Id.
135. The Commission has aided units in establishing accounting systems and has published
a reporting and auditing guide for local governments. It is presently in the process of printing
and distributing a modular accounting plan designed for municipalities with populations up to
25,000 (the size units with the greatest need for such assistance). The Commission has helped
units individually with other financial management problems; moreover, it has published and
promoted various programs intended to increase the quality of local fiscal administration. (For
example, recently it successfully initiated a program for better local cash management, empha-
sizing the need for investment 6f temporarily idle municipal funds). Barnes Interview.
136. The study showed net interest costs for North Carolina local government bonds to be
35 to 100 basis points (.35 to 1.0%) lower than net interest incurred by other southern communi-
ties offering general obligation bonds of similar maturity with comparable debt to true property
value ratios. Renshaw, Reeb & Forbes, The States and the Local Government Bond Market,
The Bond Buyer (Daily and Weekly) (MFOA Special Conference Issue, No. 2, June 21, 1971)
at 61. The saving for municipalities indicated by this interest rate differential is significant: the




ties.'37 As the number of issues available on the national market has
grown, investors have had less opportunity for detailed scrutiny of
particular issues and have relied more heavily on bond ratings in
choosing which unit's offering they will buy.'38 Naturally, interest
rates demanded by investors bidding for issues decrease as a unit's
rating increases.' 39 In 1970, North Carolina had a larger percent of
its units rated in the top three classes by one national rating agency
than the other southern states.' The state also had proportionately
fewer unrated issues than either the northern, western, or southern
areas.' In addition, more North Carolina municipalities improved
their ratings between 1935 and 1970 than did units in the remainder
of the South.4 2 The bond ratings are controlled principally by the
financial condition of a unit, but the quality of information forwarded
to the rating agency can influence the relative standing of a given
municipality.4 3 By significantly contributing to the general fiscal
137. Bond ratings provide a graduated categorization of bond issues according to their
estimated investment quality. STUDY 232. Bonds are appraised according to the risk which they
entail for the potential investor. The two factors of primary importance to the bond rating
agency are the risk that the issuing unit will "dilute" the bond quality through inordinate future
increases in debt, thus lowering its marketability and value to the purchaser, and the risk that
the unit may be unable to meet debt service requirements in the event of depressed business
conditions, thereby defaulting on the bonds. Id. at 237. To assess these two risk factors, the
rating agency undertakes a detailed analysis of a community's overall financial status, its
economic structure, its growth potential and cultural make-up, and its indebtedness. See Clark,
Observations Concerning the Rating of Municipal Bonds and Credits, MFOA SPECIAL BULLE-
TIN, Oct. 1, 1971, at 4-5. See generally Clark, Local Government Bond Ratings: The Changing
Scene, 34 POPULAR GOV'T 20 (1968).
138. STUDY 231.
139. The difference of one grade in a rating or between similar rated and unrated issues
usually results in an interest differential of 25 to 50 basis points (.25-.50%). Id. at 236.
140. According to the study, in 1970, 50.6% of North Carolina's bond issues were rated
Aaa, Aa, or A by Moody's Investors Service, as compared with 28.9% for a group of eleven
other southern states. D. Reeb (unpublished research, Dept. of Economics, SUNY at Albany).
141. Only 6.6% of the North Carolina issues were unrated, contrasted to 11.4, 15.3, and
38.4% for the northern, western, and southern areas, Id. North Carolina's low number of
unrated issues is significant because of the usual interest rate differential between similar rated
and unrated issues. See note 139 supra. Typically, the nonrated bond is not so readily marketa-
ble as one that is rated. STUDY 240. Many investment bankers are hesitant to place unrated
issues in their portfolios. As the Director of Finance for New York City noted: "When you
have an unrated bond, the unrated bond unhappily has a faint odor about it, and it places a
burden of proof on the individual banker to show the [bank] examiner why it is a justifiable
investment." Hearings on Financing Municipal Facilities Before the Subcomm. on Economic
Progress of the Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 1, at 64 (1967).
142. 92.8% of the North Carolina unit ratings improved, while 68.7% of the ratings in other
southern states advanced. D. Reeb, supra note 140.
143. See generally Clark, Observations, supra note 137, at 2-3.
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integrity of local units, by requiring units to keep accurate financial
records and make periodic reports, and by encouraging and assisting
units in the process of acquiring bond ratings,'44 the Commission has
largely determined the higher ratings of the state's municipalities.
Other factors have contributed to the lower interest costs. Inves-
tors as well as rating agencies have confidence in the state's system
for controlling local debt. The Commission itself has built up good
will through handling the bonds of all local units.' Publicity and
distribution of information about issues by the Commission have
produced more advantageous sales.'46 Perhaps the mere convenience
of dealing with the Commission rather than a local unit has influ-
enced some investors favorably. 47 Certainly the expertise of the Com-
mission gained through handling a large number of issues over an
extended period of time has resulted in profitable sales within a fluc-
tuating market.
The work of the Local Government Commission has especially
benefited the small communities which issue bonds infrequently and
lack the expertise to plan, prepare, and sell a bond issue. 48 Small
units (particularly those with populations less than 10,000) typically
are penalized for their size in the rate of interest they must pay on
bonds.'49 A variety of factors effectuate this result: unfamiliarity with
the unit by large investors, inadequacy of financial information sup-
plied to bond analysts and investors, failure to obtain expert advice
regarding bond specifications and mechanics of sale, absence of a
bond rating, high overhead costs in bond marketing relative to the
144. Besides drafting and making available a publication describing bond ratings, the Com-
mission advises units in the mechanics of obtaining ratings and periodically furnishes the rating
agencies with a calendar of North Carolina issues that are to be sold. Barnes Interview.
145. In most states when municipal bonds are sold, investors send representatives to the
local unit to insure that bids are properly awarded. Sales by the Commission are usually
attended only by local investors, each of whom may bring in bids from out of town or out of
state firms. Barnes Interview. Being able to rely on the integrity of the Commission saves
investors both money and inconvenience by eliminating the need for personal appearance at
bond sales.
146. See note 86 supra.
147. In cases where a unit fails, through oversight, to make a payment of principal and
interest on a bond, the bondholder customarily calls the Commission to inquire about the
deficiency, and the Commission, in turn, prods the local unit and gains quick compliance. The
practical advantage for the investor of dealing with the central agency rather than becoming
involved with a municipality is apparent. Barnes Interview.
148. For discussion of the credit problems of small municipalities, see generally STUDY 248-




small size of the issue, and lack of expertise in bond marketing. 5" The
Commission has helped to compensate for or to eliminate the defi-
ciencies of smaller North Carolina municipalities in each of these
areas. Although the necessity for compulsory supervision and sale of
all bond issues by the Commission has on occasion been ques-
tioned,' the control feature has been a vital factor in improving the
general financial status and the debt issuing practices of small local
governments. If the compulsory aspects of the statute were elimi-
nated and supervision by the Commission were made voluntary, units
planning debt issues of borderline or unacceptable feasibility would
tend to avoid consultation. At present the statutory powers of the
Commission underscore its recommendations to local units, thereby
encouraging compliance and making actual exercise of authority
largely unnecessary.5 2 On the other hand, the statute could probably
be revised to make consultation with the Commission by large munic-
ipalities voluntary without sacrificing the efficiency of the present
system. Since large units have the services of more highly qualified
financial personnel and their debt issuance proposals seldom present
problems for the Commission, they could be allowed to plan and sell
their own bond issues.
Conclusion
The comprehensive nature of the North Carolina approach to
control of local debt makes it a model suitable for adaptation to local
conditions of other states. The compulsory aspects of the statute,
heretofore relatively unaccepted for use elsewhere, 53 might be recon-
sidered by other states in light of the success which has been realized
in the North Carolina system without a deleterious effect on local
autonomy.' Certainly, all states and local governments which have
experienced difficulties with existing systems for limiting municipal
debt or are interested in lowering the cost of local borrowing (and
ultimately, the taxpayer's burden), should consider some form of
state supervision of local debt issuance and state technical assistance
to borrowing units. North Carolina's unique Local Government Act
and its pace-setting plan for local debt control by the Local Govern-
ment Commission provide an established, successful, and instructive
example for all such interested units.
150. Id. at II.
151. See Craigie, supra note 42; Stason 854-55.
152. Barnes Interview.
153. See notes 42, 50 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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